Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7dcf935a24039dff…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

871.4 KB Created: 2023-03-09 05:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: eb029e7b6d75ba082d539a4646efa55d SHA-1: e4a8e4673ebfba0cea2d9755535bc93896b44183 SHA-256: 7dcf935a24039dff2d084f41ab8ca318b28c53c01f9de069f087b3be15457ba9
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a Microsoft Office document that leverages CVE-2023-36884 and CVE-2017-8759 related vulnerabilities. It contains an external OLE object pointing to 'https://paknavy.defpak.org/5973/1/8665/2/0/0/0/m/files-f8fd19ec/file.rtf'. This indicates the document is designed to exploit these vulnerabilities to load and potentially execute a malicious RTF file from the specified URL, likely as a downloader for further stages.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884
    Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (https://paknavy.defpak.org/5973/1/8665/2/0/0/0/m/files-f8fd19ec/file.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

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