Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7dcadb0e503e51d6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: b60c9db6ba5b531f5a6336e0ac06e8ca SHA-1: 46db9edb5d9088f22680949f67d2dd688de6f2e5 SHA-256: 7dcadb0e503e51d6f24c3e245cb28443d2ab5b5954454c44e3207d1fbcfdfe52
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated, leading to code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via vulnerable applications.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b0.bin
3151fa53cdd2182678c93f30c81125d23825c52398573874c0ec0a3bface6253
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB0 1738 bytes