Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7dac56b3092888a6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

74.5 KB Created: 2021-01-22 09:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 28364b381ddbb05fab23b9b5d5348fc3 SHA-1: cb84b0b062f8bf3d292639fe1c9d7a41c4427b1e SHA-256: 7dac56b3092888a6dd1438bfbf959bf136791d806af130ac2fc5430e99b315b0
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen macro that utilizes the ShellExecute function. This script reconstructs a URL from obfuscated byte arrays and uses it as an argument for ShellExecute, indicating it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of the AutoOpen macro and Shell() call strongly suggests a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.8f0f0f0fe0f0f0f0-OOXML-9981534-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.8f0f0f0fe0f0f0f0-OOXML-9981534-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c7c8d63242c513b8759effd3adde6cdeba2ee6b1a611e4859ca063f3a238a754
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1454 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
c9f0999e77f25da8f0c71fbca61d68fc3b63416d813cd83d8561237dd2c1188c
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 18432 bytes