Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d964cfc67d19b66…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.18 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: a244b37ecf0155652bc62110a9ff647d SHA-1: d5820341f47b38674a7acc722abbcf4482e3d9a8 SHA-256: 7d964cfc67d19b66eab04bf9fac5cec92f1cef183ea2609009415f0cb5752b50
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that is activated by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities. Specifically, the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics strongly suggest the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of OLE object data further supports this. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, but the technical indicators point to a malicious exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00107e54.bin
e5f50532a025c6cc25a546647b5ea1931712f150fb4668a8bdd7529de72cdc90		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x107E54 3732 bytes

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