Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d831dd28f385cff…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.3 KB First seen: 2022-11-14
MD5: 2f8c6ab024e7220b97accb69667be964 SHA-1: e1d11b111d9fc47d732dd07eb92aa511dbc3a741 SHA-256: 7d831dd28f385cff9109cb7a89ad755c4c745cccc1fb23c2a02fad72361e8f50
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, which is a known exploit vector. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', indicating an attempt to bypass security measures and likely trigger the embedded exploit. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000052c0.bin
75350183f96c007189c64611221f22c8119ec8889bce807d61d24f18a1f760b1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x52C0 1338 bytes