Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d4ab5a581de7b12…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

142.5 KB First seen: 2024-05-20
MD5: 05296d88142eb2e6929ab8f1f5131e18 SHA-1: c242cc72aeb237706ac7a8af3f250d6772091589 SHA-256: 7d4ab5a581de7b1243a23c4383bb962d530bfc85c67f48e094b82301d1ff0654
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body presents a lure about financial audits and prompts the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger the exploit. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further indicates the exploitation of OLE object handling.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000b993.bin
45551959b9f52a501d04ccfbfce497f810bbcf7e8b4f1ffc3ea57b91e29d2d52
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB993 1573 bytes