Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d4a929b727d4017…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

186.5 KB Created: 2020-09-15 11:47:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: a6e178bedc38f349a41ec20e7c6db2fb SHA-1: d18439d1cfd384d245a75d44c8e27ce0c48628b2 SHA-256: 7d4a929b727d401789b88c478808ecdd70d234405b6eb45576badd1518b87843
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This macro is obfuscated but appears to construct and execute a PowerShell command. The ClamAV signature 'Doc.Dropper.EmotetWinMob0920-9636503-0' strongly suggests this is an Emotet variant, which typically uses such mechanisms to download and execute further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 7

  • Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL
    OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.EmotetWinMob0920-9636503-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.EmotetWinMob0920-9636503-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b8e07f1a26e378ad66aa45e874b33eb98cd646ec4a53c9d43f1763af1b17616f
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 22982 bytes