Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d420d8395f8b5c9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

85.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: acc95030786bcdecaf60729fa3a79f53 SHA-1: 25f6772c9663def3a977c5176c3e95dc430e2250 SHA-256: 7d420d8395f8b5c904a27079988cd67b715b55cc2f910bb678c67f70f821ec5a
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an Excel 4.0 spreadsheet containing an Auto_Open macro, which is a known technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The document body presents a fake DocuSign interface to lure the user into enabling macros. The Auto_Open macro uses dangerous formula APIs, including RUN, to download a second-stage payload from the provided URLs.

Heuristics 5

  • Excel 4.0 Auto_Open defined name critical OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN_DEFINEDNAME
    oletools recovered an Auto_Open / Auto_Close entry from an Excel 4.0 macro sheet. The raw BIFF name can be tokenized or partially opaque to byte-string checks, but the recovered macro listing confirms the workbook has an XLM auto-execution entry.
  • XLM Auto_Open with dangerous formula APIs critical OLE_XLM_DANGEROUS_FN
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet contains an Auto_Open / Auto_Close entry and dangerous XLM formula APIs that can invoke programs, write files, or transfer control without VBA.
  • Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://emqjj27ljgl02hqqzi.com/fedara.Z
    • http://emqjj27ljgl02hqqzi.com/fedara

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_macros.txt
feafe144ad0d648093c17f77ec447eb9422285f16cacaa6a3fb11b0ab7fa03a4
xlm-macro oletools.olevba.extract_all_macros (XLM macro listing) 2100 bytes