Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d1bd0f1e6c73ead…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

402.0 KB
MD5: 9a21b20bf0f722b2cd46058cbfad5571 SHA-1: f359c45f331d5b159a1ae6ef80135f937bf32856 SHA-256: 7d1bd0f1e6c73ead87681243ebfc1576158807ae4d3448d39b1ee35db265b753
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that uses default encryption, indicating an attempt to hide its contents. The presence of embedded OLE objects suggests it's designed as an exploit carrier, likely to deliver a secondary payload. Without a document body or scripts, the exact delivery mechanism and payload are not discernible, but the structure points to a malicious intent.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.