Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d1ba26b15557e09…

MALICIOUS

RTF

18.5 KB First seen: 2023-03-17
MD5: b6157bf7275c8d32dfdd87e4aefa6443 SHA-1: 7add9cff51c5e12ce24585e773fc02347d9dbc95 SHA-256: 7d1ba26b15557e0932bb07292025af17139c1f7e8b9f078ed688533b485b0cb6
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to execute arbitrary code via the Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002969.bin
02c74d7d37d8a1569a58edf0eafa0a86cb484a567bf376b7ecdbf223f598a57a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2969 1519 bytes