Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 7d09f18a36d4e707

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

446.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-06-01T11:00:00+00:00

MD5: 438b972cd69c826e66f4f99a77a1626e SHA-1: 38538908d6399bb00fdf78336a1787b3bd2425eb SHA-256: 7d09f18a36d4e707adb6afe694da50140455a1d2f2d371615687f2241bf1e7c4

170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an XLS document containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to deliver a secondary payload, in this case identified as a PDF file. The PDF itself exhibits suspicious static findings, indicating it is likely malicious. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, suggesting the primary malicious functionality is within the embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR

Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`ole10native_00.bin` `7ca08ece4dbcb5f59de6912309869bc9c7df849faaa520390cbc4e9cf6fdb59f`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD002B795F/olE10naTiVe	2027 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf` `c2005029e2a6115b0bb7504315fb39548a6755e89a0c5e8fe53a48e52b19b4c5`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000	453120 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00018200.pdf` `3c70c772da70fed5837cd71c35fcc96d95fa63d1273ad225255a86f0e4f2aaeb`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18200	358400 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00022e00.pdf` `c4da5ca7f1f2a9893d3601fd8a0b0de5b944eb6c10441b47eb89c362bd1a02be`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x22E00	314368 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00039e00.pdf` `0794b4a6811080296da8e5cc199535fae63fe5b71f728347087044047fe955d3`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x39E00	220160 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.