Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d041522249402d6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

29.8 KB Created: 2008-07-26 19:43:58 Authoring application: Scribus 1.3.3.12 (via Scribus PDF Library 1.3.3.12)
MD5: ae0e08ad7bca2c89b4c8db37605420cf SHA-1: f4e066bf7fb06d504a5ef252d774f50ea63d1123 SHA-256: 7d041522249402d6eb46ed8c676632e2cddb192f74d58c7ea47fc81792100091
430 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://109.95.114.251/usr5432/load.php. This indicates a clear intent to compromise the user's system by leveraging outdated software.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Quoted-hex fragment JavaScript stager high PDF_QUOTED_HEX_FRAGMENT_JS_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript stores the hidden exploit stage as many quoted hexadecimal fragments, joins them through helper functions, and evals the recovered JavaScript. The decoder is bounded and only fires when the recovered stage contains concrete Acrobat exploit APIs or heap-spray shellcode markers.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://109.95.114.251/usr5432/load.php

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_000.js
53b01a9c9cd1dae0d221328c0ceb9e02180995a7f07d1fb5963af0329e7fa1ed
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x336 28904 bytes
javascript_obj0013_001.js
c58c93a9d54e8cc76947834bff020f0fb56c30bd55098eb31bc2813e85750ed8
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x359 29609 bytes
quoted_hex_fragment_stage_000.js
4d5374d44b4fde5058544400cfaa0e805b6860a68bf32a3a82a7a9b03986aef4
deobfuscated-js quoted-hex fragment decoded JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x409 5367 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).