Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7d02fdc31ca58456…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.1 KB Created: 2021-03-02 23:40:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: b676487adad1a83dc15bf65e30c4fd26 SHA-1: 05c9dde9853da47d6decfb1cde221ebc5ee03aee SHA-256: 7d02fdc31ca58456010d43dbbe1ba2ec9c20b640f279475769c0582b6d090f92
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to direct users to potentially malicious content. Heuristics like PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM and PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM strongly suggest this malicious intent. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further confirm its malicious nature, likely as a phishing or malware distribution vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/wix?keyword=theoretical+yield+and+limiting+reagents+worksheet PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/feguzuvubut/qijigDv/thor_ragnarok_korg_scenes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381551/normal_5fd1f175ad556.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4481278/normal_6004787d74e4a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/retepisej/V7qiGKJ/instagram_story_photo_editor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuseluxutiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134686448/rizubazod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ranalugepileli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134735155/e6d501.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vapatibu/kjdDij5/ruvute.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gagegopered.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134880179/3917017.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kosodakugup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134655388/xurog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mudabomem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969182/28e79b8812a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://butevexonukuzi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681970/37b79.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sozodumupof/bsP7gdR/78074561803.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4478134/normal_5fce1769477f6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4450506/normal_5fc77314bef7c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://movudari.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070737/9f0398ece9d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vamekatowozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814347/kizuwularo_xusafesozani.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zetanitanedo/WI0biba/godopikebegumajefimab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jarirotexab/silver_plated_beryllium_copper_sheet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/baxegezivumi/nofasutovonivolug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fizaxo/potopepab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e375.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE375 5560 bytes
SHA-256: bf6951edca162c1df2cb943d94f19447b1284699833a4f1f6134a2417c4f9693
font_01_sfnt_off0000f64d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF64D 10044 bytes
SHA-256: e3481036efe5fbcbf8d64949a6db850c92e8aaa6bcb7253c211a94ed69a4465f

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.