Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cfa40a1d9e75605…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.5 KB Created: 2021-07-30 00:23:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d7d232b5813d99662b43ddb732bfef4e SHA-1: ec5f2d0e4ce15e6ce7abd48d75e3e08a3e59e0bd SHA-256: 7cfa40a1d9e75605f2da3af9a9618067c2fd3a030ccd977efb46a8b3c0f85072
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. Numerous heuristics point to the PDF acting as a link farm, directing users to compromised WordPress sites and potentially malicious external URLs. The presence of embedded URLs and the nature of the heuristics suggest the primary goal is to redirect users to phishing or malware-hosting sites, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://irlanc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=metal+songs+mp3+downloads+2010
    • http://aksaxena.com/bpms/includes/fckeditor_uploads/userfiles/file/38519767181.pdf
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc940b439e---99392803252.pdf
    • http://iamsoldierfit.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160befb596c24f---pogaf.pdf
    • https://psychotherapie-dr-albrecht.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f1c98f6723c---92363646323.pdf
    • http://pattersonandoliphantfamily.com/clients/875492/File/wotakevutemorux.pdf
    • http://larrysiegellaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/larar.pdf
    • https://luxartparquet.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c5a5c1b6e32cec083c9fbfc82325ac90/14867792770.pdf
    • http://www.nuricomuvakfi.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2v0ba2jvesgknlmjcv07duel15/45183110232.pdf
    • https://binarbaid.com/public_html/userfiles/file/jebugumepebexirovefu.pdf
    • http://triumphtoday.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cc5eff121b6---ridopemigukimurizimovu.pdf
    • http://gursakaryahukuk.com/images/file/jidekakozawatoruxixi.pdf
    • http://queuemanagementsystems.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d63abcc6ce---tezefogus.pdf
    • https://weblative.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/sldpofuiv1d01kjigkktu9r5ch/49551037654.pdf
    • http://www.rkcomdesignservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a5a217b10c5---58579805463.pdf
    • http://3handseg.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e973aeb43a---41228628456.pdf
    • http://globalnetworks.de/www.galabau-poscher.de/main/preview/ckfinder/userfiles/files/12090225364.pdf
    • https://www.sanier.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/u1iu26j7jc072vo5m079thofb8/21222343347.pdf
    • http://conservationenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607200e698e9b---kaxelenekorobozozafekiji.pdf
    • http://arci-mp.fr/admin/File/guxagowezafugofixela.pdf
    • https://alihuata.com/userfiles/file/1423231399.pdf
    • http://www.socalgreatwhite.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072bb3f6cc34---45958199534.pdf
    • http://jjmcp.jp/userfiles/Image/file/87235788419.pdf
    • https://www.pfgpartners.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ff982f0134---bodenefaku.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f22e.bin
16defe116230d4b320283d0349af67e3e9d8041303b45c50d0d74fd777c18074
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF22E 17096 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011f03.bin
0891367948c3463d99d50e0b6be26d70e53fc468edcfab080a595cb56b0fd88d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11F03 11088 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000138d7.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x138D7 16792 bytes