Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cee2955d8fee68f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

14.9 KB First seen: 2023-02-28
MD5: a0d3000e5792081fa970184fe592808f SHA-1: 551941fd7e55cb98ea3a2f315fabe1d2b0a0b935 SHA-256: 7cee2955d8fee68f5501d86c84159f3e8cefcd52476a950a5712b84bbb1feedd
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" heuristic indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, though no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001dc4.bin
34311495c17ee49bfe135d405c77d7e9a266b22896a1642d05b2aab185dce97b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DC4 1630 bytes