Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ce03706ca499ae0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSM

54.5 KB Created: 2020-11-23 12:16:02 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: b403bcb2e1902f9851753976c5e6c3a7 SHA-1: 845932e0c3c0b743f5fb5eb56d3e056706ab91d6 SHA-256: 7ce03706ca499ae052de8bdaf9181f4f059cae19fd22fd52a902e2fcdb27f32e
80 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_ACTIVEX_XLM_CELL_STAGER' indicates that VBA ActiveX events are used to run worksheet-decoded XLM formulas. The extracted VBA macro confirms this by using `ExecuteExcel4Macro` on obfuscated strings. This technique is commonly used to download and execute further stages of malware. The macro's obfuscation makes it difficult to determine the exact payload or destination, hence the 'unknown family' classification.

Heuristics 2

  • VBA ActiveX event runs worksheet-decoded XLM formulas critical OLE_VBA_ACTIVEX_XLM_CELL_STAGER
    VBA code attached to an ActiveX/UserForm event reconstructs formula text from worksheet constants using Split/Replace/Mid or character shifting, then executes it through ExecuteExcel4Macro or Run. This is a high-confidence malware stager that hides XLM formula execution in sheet cells; it is not a document-parser CVE.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b04961a05ea4f10a5e69c42a567fdfaa29363ec6dedce4d85b473095ba26f417
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1141 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d0c80d154439bd128bce8d27e755ae8c7c53c6947328e71598b4aa4e56df63a0
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 16384 bytes
emf_00.emf
76f287b1e3251b7e0e5ba27bfb05b35831150cc665de00f9fd2d807e2d2a028d
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image1.emf 1976 bytes