Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cda47e4a882a931…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

36.0 KB First seen: 2022-11-11
MD5: 2662c47783dc1e0689412aaf2531bb47 SHA-1: 1f4fdcb29d93e834ce684afec4df553bfcbb027f SHA-256: 7cda47e4a882a9314140ef3739d6e75d9a960bc9da035dd5160055a0aefb5556
208 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE Excel file containing a Document_Open macro. This macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands or download additional payloads. The presence of CreateObject() further suggests dynamic execution capabilities. While the exact URL or command is obfuscated, the overall pattern points to a downloader or initial execution stage.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 36,864 bytes but its declared streams total only 7,894 bytes — 28,970 bytes (79%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8a2230a72e8b3a55a1f56657cf42a94a44556d03caaaef6e640332b0de8ce4e3
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 17973 bytes