Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cce268286dbb0b5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

117.5 KB
MD5: ba803df25544fde45f6d6990e87e0bb9 SHA-1: e1da00ddf4eec5669cfe1314e9689e0b9e3dacae SHA-256: 7cce268286dbb0b507a45f282eb65510f935c6aa82d4d8c309eb616e4cc8ad0f
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an OLE document with a significant amount of slack space, indicating potential obfuscation. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, along with XOR-encoded strings, suggesting the execution of malicious code. The presence of embedded OLE objects further supports a malicious intent, likely as a container for further payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x03) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x03: 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'VirtualProtect', 'VirtualProtectEx', 'CreateProcessA', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'ReadProcessMemory'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 120,320 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 88,969 bytes (74%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

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