Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ccac195975f1093…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.3 KB Created: 2021-02-14 22:36:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-22
MD5: 3903afebca5b8cf5d8b12ac3320cefc0 SHA-1: 906a2a87b0db8e9dd3836b71b548a58b46d7d42e SHA-256: 7ccac195975f109322389ef796569de3fc4ba355b89e050f68c325509469ab3c
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

This PDF document was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing and trojan delivery mechanism. Heuristics indicate it uses social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, instructing the user to press Win+R or paste commands into a terminal, likely to execute a downloaded payload. The document contains numerous external links, including one pointing to 'crophysi.ru', suggesting a link farm or redirection to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=explorer.exe+server+execution+failed+windows+8.1 PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zolewiko/Shagdhc/1625615837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kedilexele/5kiSidY/manga_maker_online.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://litizabege.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134713043/8236206.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fapojenulexo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383319/jelube_tijozex_punij_sevutuvigerufog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4456393/normal_5ff598f86ec85.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xitupiwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489196/19f058ff3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zozijawutuxu/HwjehfV/mewofevemawodijojolebil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fepanaxowa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134311119/2096084.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kofagegupuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302723/0df30618b09.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4366055/normal_600369bc90fdf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nomazotesi/ibjfjcU/financial_times_global_mba_rankings_2018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zibenoroduzuw/attributes_of_cadastral_information_system.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zesixefe/77070026406.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xifabilejilab/buckaroo_banzai_sheet_music.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nazekisigiduz/dugamifewiruzasigule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pululusodogi/danagotugamijujena.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/topipovikapari/spencer_centrifugal_blower.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zabevog/bible_story_full_movie_in_tamil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tosevud/free_employee_expense_report_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000df7c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF7C 5484 bytes
SHA-256: 47f6f322ecc1312dbf2816793bb0693c174168ae1c0745ec74705706528a23bb
font_01_sfnt_off0000f254.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF254 10348 bytes
SHA-256: 7c95620fb1a062fcc9a57f7ed6e4e92a07cd7885ac24880d836e6578c3d4164b
font_02_sfnt_off0001159b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1159B 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2