RTF malware analysis — malicious · 7cb995c84cad428d

MALICIOUS

RTF

96.6 KB First seen: 2024-07-31

MD5: 8309f0ffdf7ccd70c8a3bc61fb01085b SHA-1: 8b619873a22c3f25c9f38b3f1d5cfaa20f353c0c SHA-256: 7cb995c84cad428dd2183e8ca94d7b07cdb154d8a5fdc23ab50cc6ff72fa1af7

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000b56.bin` `a77d0b15dbb4733015e5f33991d1e3e1e22fc0219adf4290033f06ace70f1573`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xB56	2084 bytes

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