Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cae6e76b9ec4604…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-10-16 17:46:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 782eb872aecfbb93290553298e371994 SHA-1: 27df6fc415d1d17f831936eeb13ebb044243fd1c SHA-256: 7cae6e76b9ec46043cfcf91117c0c5e01adccabc231b32ac09b26df7918a51cd
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to various PDF files hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme. One of the links directs to a known malicious redirector, suggesting a potential distribution or phishing vector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/123?keyword=edgar+allan+poe+poes%25C3%25ADa+completa+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://jufaxexave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775513/litasifix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jufaxexave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775513/f1dfc27.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://juragubiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874328/volanufidejugizud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zekuwatifakaxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815855/gelusuboduka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/gowijipomunolu_lirogub_loletakimup_rozugofekowe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365602/normal_5f88f73044726.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366028/normal_5f870f140d443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369915/normal_5f8960ea608b2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374379/normal_5f89890d9b311.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tidoxanarapora.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710787/sisiso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/zanadutut_wexudafenatogun_jetomefoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/foburadip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/tunitulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelobutino.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969458/de1873099dc7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/1441493.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6b73e5d7-9cc5-4da5-8af7-0b31a76b3c33/81830433072.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b3a42e9e-e46b-48bc-b851-770ba434287c/zazorapesasipubojosezadam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0494/6670/4039/files/android_java_string_format_boolean.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0463/9552/3227/files/5e_bounty_hunter_class.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0494/1689/6679/files/75521318546.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9628/6119/files/87414030089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000659d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x659D 5484 bytes
SHA-256: 8451703f417f859ab901c856994539373ae34fb739ea2d211b8d11d280036599
font_01_sfnt_off00007833.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7833 11048 bytes
SHA-256: b972263705917480883a4ebd40b162594e0becd2b60a1dbb5ec3aca1ae8838d4