Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cad577196aab054…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.9 KB Created: 2020-07-08 21:03:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4871d44b34da371be491c20d163486e9 SHA-1: cd813e361383feef2812cbcd2c522779530735c9 SHA-256: 7cad577196aab0548414508fb9d9322d98cca6d56243b9b89580505b9fd12d26
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded URLs, forming a link farm. One of these URLs, 'https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=oswaal%20books%20for%20class%2010%20maths%20pdf', is flagged as a known malicious redirector. The majority of the links point to external PDF files hosted on various domains, many of which appear to be disposable, suggesting a tactic to distribute malicious content or engage in SEO manipulation. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=oswaal%20books%20for%20class%2010%20maths%20pdf
    • http://files.pawsitivelyunleashed.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695493/zuvog_niraporibum_lazuv_savapos.pdf
    • http://files.maureenennsstudioltd.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814785/jibuzupure-serizurot.pdf
    • http://files.kocanada-usa.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437538/zorodoke.pdf
    • http://files.mrsbscusd.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407155/zonutidigobi.pdf
    • http://files.nickpateras.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710655/d914f150ae.pdf
    • http://files.bbsimon.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682570/tudijimavu.pdf
    • http://files.musicatmainstreet.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739839/davetuxu.pdf
    • http://files.montebellobrewerbaseball.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438835/38f527851f.pdf
    • http://files.trytank.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969986/votavivuzete_dadonorafe.pdf
    • http://files.whistlingfrogresort.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681002/masaberilanimubaloji.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://dozuwezixuw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dekabefedobogamakabeli.pdf
    • https://pixaxaxaluz585082879.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xabojelok.pdf
    • https://vusipubaze.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nuxoxuxaruzajomuno.pdf
    • https://dadikopur.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/libigotikazamosumubo.pdf
    • https://jutufunenuk.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/87602836230.pdf
    • https://wididoripelo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/rugejuvepo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/23342697578.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/bodadajigewodozisidezufe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/totavari.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000861a.bin
d833c2f03e7c9714315d92094232c851042a5d938ec02d6d54ff1e532f18f04c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x861A 5428 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009891.bin
b105c7689465ad7f516a6cd6e8f473ca811446b02c01e8a672d18253e13482b3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9891 13288 bytes

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