Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ca38c19510f095c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 764b99c58e38a881476608006f242d48 SHA-1: de51cca3b7d891cfc5709ac2b496ae2f99810bee SHA-256: 7ca38c19510f095ca6868eebf2c215f9bd28bcc5956c6ca0f95b932160086577
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit the embedded object. This strongly suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code via the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bf.bin
28bcc2a2a6e4e38601bed49d28b9b4686f0d7945e266bb2c6cecfd41418187bd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF 1845 bytes