Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c911b4d457b1b61…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

59.9 KB Created: 2020-10-05 21:49:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: f41a14859f324f4b208163475c347837 SHA-1: 01facbf9132aea6e12300d19119f434a7079f8f0 SHA-256: 7c911b4d457b1b6124a1211cd4737c056e9a12dc930a05edfe7289cbed11e86c
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution trigger. This macro utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to launch a WMI process, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The script attempts to download a file from 'http://raw.githubusercontent.com/fbarlao/master/main/finla.jpg' and save it as 'c4grxeqccvapp.vbs' in the temporary directory, likely to execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a7c0f94aa15b9513250aa19e3c29fdd709c5091195fe1a9a044b83747a7f9ed5		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3391 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
c43dc49bfdd115dcd746f36d20abd2d7cc38adf7f4c0c16fa8e4598d484caff8		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16896 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.