Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c69833c3052c30e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.5 KB Created: 2021-09-15 19:01:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 7076b593b9b832615d3ef09d2858527b SHA-1: 4a46d4fccd6fe1470990bb82853d4105b967d518 SHA-256: 7c69833c3052c30e99946124d2fe54250c22f10d55922e34daaf268bfd7748bc
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a PDF file flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, specifically as a phishing trojan. It contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised CMS upload storage or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of external URIs and link farms indicates an attempt to direct users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ketchas.ru/uplcv?utm_term=watch+shrek+online+123
    • http://bidwoodmachine.com/d/files/vosekemibij.pdf
    • http://cieplej.pl/imgturysta/file/zixuzigonifafajo.pdf
    • http://unsersohn.ch/images/file/reponifapodelerivina.pdf
    • http://asiavent.com/UserFiles/file///dokusugofevatusadewipimot.pdf
    • https://aynispirit.nl/userfiles/file/lezaxonuful.pdf
    • http://mitchelllawoffice.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/3516148519.pdf
    • http://feuerwehr-mittenwalde.de/mediathek/files/zijofanufapudunixibu.pdf
    • http://www.movingintofreedom.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136cae60276e---kidatod.pdf
    • http://e-instar.com/userfiles/file/83120479115.pdf
    • https://futurefacesmiami.com/uploads/file/pasekewutifinuzawinoto.pdf
    • http://www.alwaysflorida.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613e6aaab8389---75875494910.pdf
    • http://sanzmendia.com/userfiles/files/bafazobesakoxurizad.pdf
    • http://stroykap.com/application/views/stroykap/userfiles/file/naxobimuvajube.pdf
    • http://www.marcelasemper.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612e990d11ae5---41630363138.pdf
    • http://3qbuy.com/CKEdit/upload/files/xevodaz.pdf
    • https://huanghecables.com/d/files/gifarile.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d1ed.bin
e17c32da0fe4f169e906046b97fe89680afb95dbaabf4887d8c0b04e17f300ee		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD1ED 10756 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000eac9.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAC9 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000102db.bin
a2c420458324f46377f91c8731d6b725c4073f06c16e17bd23c09e0767d48645		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x102DB 17844 bytes

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