Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c5e90c5504c6541…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

10.7 KB
MD5: 34f8bd42f9987f082191e22ef6027dd0 SHA-1: b82bdaff29d423ec1c6afe4ead3624bd3c371cb1 SHA-256: 7c5e90c5504c654169d1ac9d261b240ac57bc360207e3e9b6ca8fba6aa27d5fd
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Microsoft Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, which allows for arbitrary code execution. This technique is commonly used to deliver secondary payloads, making it a critical vector for initial compromise via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000014a8.bin
96b35f9785ffa81ea672c5967bf26b4bb38da680034cd6fb4fb16a44b3e9a59e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14A8 2107 bytes