Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c5b5675a7e4a689…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.6 KB Created: 2020-11-08 13:34:56 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: ac0a05cffe5d708b98a9566e5c4d797b SHA-1: b4091519070f20174310d59517fbeaff0a7d1665 SHA-256: 7c5b5675a7e4a689c7a51400ac603073faedd091211b879043d9e2201131987d
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document functions as a link farm, directing users to multiple external websites, including a known malicious redirector at `traffine.ru`. The document's content appears to be a lure, possibly related to product information, to encourage clicks on these malicious links. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of numerous links on disposable hosting further supports a malicious intent to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/aws?keyword=bunn+coffee+maker+with+water+line In PDF document text
    • https://doxeduzawixufak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134383044/15d34191d21f80c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://minibimegoviw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333268/7373561.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabulibatelirip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134597637/dujataz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://taguraridefukal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446716/berenozunifu_lubowotevovuvi_lajosuwitemaje_lubalufal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keruzexutebimoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310977/6643768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://notapogixunimo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363186/212676.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://woliwejimagevin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319070/tukagazap-minete.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://babunugigexi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134582988/368661.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7e17a5e7-7a6b-4a08-9ad2-e93583e2480f/fetogetefilezun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopijetiza.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/33726088252.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://likuzow.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/40264502684.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005df5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5DF5 5032 bytes
SHA-256: 6d4941b68de0aa65d19678bc40da35fb21af0ad2e25e94585a9ee410c2799e48
font_01_sfnt_off00006ef0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EF0 10812 bytes
SHA-256: 212acb28016ae65dabe3ac25bd91120e74ebca589f0625bd5397914015f6297e
font_02_sfnt_off000093bc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x93BC 4324 bytes
SHA-256: a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f