Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c58eed1d9cdea21…

MALICIOUS

RTF

39.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-18
MD5: 479e992a7ce7706ebd31a56f0d126f4e SHA-1: 2181b6fb66d9cdf80bf72eeefbd944394818e678 SHA-256: 7c58eed1d9cdea2185170b62d033d2ed11347277f9c9853b88ae16fde08fd332
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate and SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristics suggests the document is designed to trick the user into activating the OLE object, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000041ab.bin
d49faba5e8c15896cdf25a8d62759e9f3033657a2f1ebba8b3693e5bf9a96e98
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x41AB 1848 bytes