Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c5801dad7732ec4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

100.5 KB Created: 2021-07-08 04:27:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: 5e6df94f777a139d070784d4adca6dd5 SHA-1: 6bf18847839ded54b98571c94826fb4129d7903c SHA-256: 7c5801dad7732ec4706141cb04142aa1237e461ff94973ae1826f167cc21c7c1
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a link farm pointing to multiple compromised WordPress sites, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the redirection to malicious URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9929

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://humanistbeauty.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/o4mmt2j0k7nt8v4gmg4dq3s0h0/54329746902.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://ecomassage.pt/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lt8apkbhk7vr2g8d9vdf3a7pnn/42236101919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartvoicecom.com/userfiles/531707398.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://phenix-security.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084382c0a4ce---83613474251.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yaeram.com/userData/board/file/bajegevug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lightingsolutionsal.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0af0859ef57da3f4978d0dbe344d488b/77061789776.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://m-co.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lmhg63bbkp3v6e24lo1apolmkm/41474178068.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.marvistasales.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3eeb288f40853ffb3e3be07404849bd2/teluridesikakelirenini.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://markiza-trade.ru/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sebafitimagepuxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://charmingcurls.se/upload/file/xatukej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lbhs1965.com/clients/6/6b/6bdd8f708684a1f547efbf97e1630fe5/File/gozoxidivasuzez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://basyapiemlak.com/yukleme_klasoru/userfiles/file/pogonejuvuvofakinos.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://arserwood.com/js/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/connector.php/upfiles/file/210531190113861726vw1ypu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.nationaalgolfcongres.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091a5d1bb29e---30269950133.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://georgeandmaryjones.com/clients/f/ff/ff66b05efb8f16ea353d8e6908bb1429/File/54447548437.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asesoriagarpe.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bc8b16547a1---poguxaletowevoselekeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aftckwt.com/uploads/file/10945027245.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spy-military-labs.com/userfiles/file/68827299712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://northstarexecutivesearch.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6b72e5b567dd2f8b84564d7f3e731d73/sibazozemataf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://training-solutions.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adf5beaa066---34131792819.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://objetivovender.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071e1661ebdb---65279648307.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wannawwannie.pl/userfiles/file/dikadigeverajogufaguwax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inchirieriavioane.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160884a43e570a---famewawa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nikoljski.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/ritokixesasedugat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lbhs1965.com/clientsIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=section+103+road+traffic+actPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00012955.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12955 16740 bytes
SHA-256: 89e5f4b002854efae0c13ce7be88e1777b0b7ad1028275278351ccc97756d394
font_01_sfnt_off000153fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x153FD 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00016c14.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16C14 10676 bytes
SHA-256: 573d2a1262875f7536db45037851ed417f89941991f2be5e92d726c1f07a5a2f