Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c3ec42f9c9d5894…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.1 KB Created: 2021-03-11 19:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 83a8c5c324eed728624fe1c9a50afe1c SHA-1: 7c1eb292b812801102e59f6317f0907eaa77e136 SHA-256: 7c3ec42f9c9d58944e1f1184ca77a0dffc15269e6c5ffb74dc8f09736cdfe78b
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and calls to Shell() and CreateObject() indicate that the macros are designed to execute arbitrary code. This is strongly suggestive of a downloader or droppper functionality, where the script likely attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, but the technique is common for initial access.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
abf2a33abf9ff2a845fb8ed9ec5c51efbaa2be5ab586ff7e8899d5795a44beae		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5206 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
9ed6f098d7b1c4be0f312dc8ed03229f8c5f22b6dcdbad96c272733a99f9a18e		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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