Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c160d6aa07d28c5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: fef3f456aa10a8b3b93586c7363d327a SHA-1: a0fd7b5bc2ea4869c92456c0e07a1026383a2707 SHA-256: 7c160d6aa07d28c5eacf5b6cdb36db5cdb46db9fcb708289a9f3e02a2af39730
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. This points to a classic exploit delivery mechanism targeting the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000008f.bin
5eae53a330c8b7033a86d705ce148e16b41a34d33057be2ac9b58dcad0a0eccf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8F 1871 bytes