Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c15e8d88f958963…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 71551182f4a6d935efc823d1287537f7 SHA-1: 047b9bc9f6cee68a1060ffa78fc4868fb2f0f584 SHA-256: 7c15e8d88f958963a0f43f9ff0bbbc114ecce7a8c00710d870c9bf01f8c2c0c5
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, specifically related to the Equation Editor. The presence of OLE objects and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggest that the embedded Equation Editor object is designed to be activated, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000aa.bin
0e78667f6f47f10ad0aa81f1615dcec609b4a3f4ad57eb8f9e29cc3e5268887e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAA 1827 bytes

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