Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c0d775c920abeac…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.4 KB Created: 2021-09-04 10:33:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: dfb125cef63f717a35be8dec4f206b0e SHA-1: 484ceb2ec52f356aeffb49450695142070025d4c SHA-256: 7c0d775c920abeac3da392dda940a33b8c787203e822ec8e03e634e3150f727d
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised WordPress installations or disposable domains, suggesting a link farm for phishing or malware distribution. The presence of 'direct deposit form pdf' in a URL parameter and the ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly indicate a phishing or credential harvesting attempt. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure and URL patterns are indicative of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9840

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=direct+deposit+form+pdf
    • https://best-turbos.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bd28e855c9d00a231770d129c37c6ef8/63544316247.pdf
    • http://europeanprofservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082a66b1522c---pometa.pdf
    • https://sk-developers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084fcce21d9a---49014337230.pdf
    • http://ecohost.ru/pics/images/file/rasudipopi.pdf
    • https://www.lesson-online.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/acmd62ptsee5v06nkvqqubmjj1/75624361855.pdf
    • http://galluccifaibano.com/userfiles/file/dukapexedipifixuxuses.pdf
    • http://xn----8sbpvg0afdbe.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kidffullu3oietivbcfisfvm41/netozezefozuluvasil.pdf
    • https://www.capitalroofingct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c7df0d0d65---pagabesovanobuxosata.pdf
    • http://thecrayfamily.com/clients/36408/File/89524674526.pdf
    • http://grupogmec.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606fe63ccdf31---giriwajezimapem.pdf
    • http://albino-pitti.com/pub_img/file/jakoromawujij.pdf
    • http://elenasteele.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c5d30b3700b---4326686297.pdf
    • http://luxlustry.ru/img/upload/jupajigunomogupoxokigusiv.pdf
    • http://coinproject.com/userfiles/image/file/sixufevumigulolasuz.pdf
    • http://materialdeestudo.top/userfiles/files/tisiponosul.pdf
    • http://lollanaclinic.com/image/upload/File/59680914182.pdf
    • http://yuha.be/_files/file/jiwawebosowaziliwal.pdf
    • http://kfnmdg.com/upfolder/e/files/20210901214603.pdf
    • http://uptownchantilly.com/uploads/files/9089774568.pdf
    • http://beiwendq.com/userfiles/file/32181771174.pdf
    • https://peilimineko.com/userfiles/file/begub.pdf
    • https://nhaban24h.com.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/skicvon38ejjtdot6ctk44asn0/55963226293.pdf
    • http://sochisushi.nl/survey/userfiles/files/pufujexategujelulopud.pdf
    • http://futboltotal.net/images/files/37069146654.pdf
    • http://ipjanah.ir/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nr74o0r6tfgoirj17tdgn9a3q7/5252263461.pdf
    • https://medok18.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/839988d503fde60ed52122c267ceac8d/zapoweven.pdf
    • http://galluccifai
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c5d8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC5D8 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ddea.bin
c4a774c9e2a0f334ee18758a6a10b036dc5fa2034e57a6df63860e0ba1e0ca6c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDDEA 18016 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010c28.bin
8e7a1a6953395128ad82a67e4736db7fe562d70473ab97d873cf7e05557ddd64		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C28 10472 bytes

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