Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7c0105bf7b3195be…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

88.6 KB First seen: 2023-08-17
MD5: 217c2ee7c1476afca10c589555f66b32 SHA-1: d0418dc2e6c755d203f0698e0bedf84954b7235b SHA-256: 7c0105bf7b3195be86c929b8ee08314a092f902bc6d3af616f58214bfbc41c9e
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). It contains an OLE object that is automatically linked and updated ( RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_OBJUPDATE), a common technique for delivering malicious content. The document body provides a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing from the yellow bar above' (SE_ENABLE_LURE), indicating a social engineering attempt to bypass security measures and execute embedded malicious code.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000317d.bin
a4603212ded7bd50a59fc5cf9e45155b77d675b729f4f5ff5eb24783b201ea4a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x317D 1787 bytes

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