Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7bfc299621802309…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.3 KB
MD5: ff4f7906e6f7e096535808be3648a5a7 SHA-1: ad6fff627aa1d245077e87924ff1c0c53a01ce48 SHA-256: 7bfc2996218023090e7bb0cc08268c1c0dcdb927134789897eaa75934689e968
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability for code execution. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b4.bin
13da95f0874b3bbe53721267af497946d09a55c3a2a5d53541d86d2d74b5e20e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB4 1517 bytes