Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7bf678e69ed0afd5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.3 KB Created: 2021-08-17 05:49:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: b49ab43edfcb2750bbbd6ce6cd2467d1 SHA-1: d319a58fd06ca4d0fe17d18a82e4ad8159fd8f06 SHA-256: 7bf678e69ed0afd52ad44f8d3e13c3dda9ae1808ddaf8cf31744fa42e1c2a59f
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a link farm directing to multiple domains, with several URLs pointing to compromised CMS upload directories. ClamAV detected this as Pdf.Phishing.Trojan, and ML classifiers strongly agree. The presence of embedded URLs and the nature of the link farm suggest an attempt to lure users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or to download further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9924

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bikinibody.be/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/me4uqvdm7uq9tvocdlchjiiare/67002114418.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://bikinibody.be/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/urji4cath2phngjrl3clavis4c/jakuvunutajima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://longchimvac.net/app/webroot/uploads/files/gumuzakenad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dammesliepas.lv/ckfinder/userfiles/files/45923794245.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totalfinance.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16104ee3d88955---fitevomatoniwojukud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://natatourism.com/userfiles/files/xetomufupeteru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://uitetenindex.nl/images/uploads/wifurasilelenikolutivap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://postscriptproductions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c75d736b00f---bonidi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vaynhe.com/upload/files/xunip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://globalclassic.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pgc6atde75022j6ufqrgp9136v/zitofabisusu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://artsketch.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ac26658e73cdca48304f708bba36e7af/81326013384.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gtsonline.nl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tmus1kljvnc6nkdmujojm69g13/61853077439.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://counterreaction.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fa80cee3db5---96382794682.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://maxitelt.no/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085c68886f06---bufage.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://auf.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pi860l9urlg5f6famou394a7d5/25074042008.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://climacom.eu/userfiles/files/62863366999.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://angelcabrera.com/FCKfiles/file/18106640711.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hhs63.org/clients/8/88/88ec95b665b56da82b1de85f097fba10/File/20115778001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paneldeconsos.com/userfiles/file/lozokogagezevik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hondaototanan.com/upload/files/54585705342.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://queuemanagementsystems.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c7654cad08---29252422197.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wpsqld.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9d1c38b4986b9d4d02ab414b5ab54955/55261177955.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://98ing.com/upload/ck/files/20210703_142428.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://harpethvalleyhealth.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/286bf4ff5eaaae7f0e4c453c8ef91c3e/sebikiwar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dlikefulproductions.com/clients/875850/File/30866799679.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://premiumresourcing.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070f8259a5e9---92513826382.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/cv9VXjIrmdE/uplcv?utm_term=big+ideas+math+blue+grade+8+answer+keyPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e2e4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2E4 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fafb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFAFB 11368 bytes
SHA-256: 4421e2094676ecf0863b2d8233d2193d83a13f28dab2fa17dbe300155c69e795
font_02_sfnt_off0001156c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1156C 17212 bytes
SHA-256: 179f0d96ce23fe6a7348c2a3189dada26a107cc44a651e77aed2c2e549ea3333