Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7bf24209d3d6efd5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.4 KB Created: 2020-07-10 21:07:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 74068b2718e72b77323c75fa43b77710 SHA-1: e5928de9994c4009eefb6743db88c749a8a23d5a SHA-256: 7bf24209d3d6efd5099ee94c60ad6ac0449af3279c1cc9ac7c88b2d8801d45aa
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting and appear to be part of a link farm. One of the primary links directs users to a known malicious redirector, indicating a potential phishing or malware distribution scheme. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=diet%20chart%20for%20weight%20loss%20for%20female%20pdf
    • http://files.bonneygirlphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381332/terubobo_bubenopujom_fivolal_nosarugirawavos.pdf
    • http://files.mableandgrace.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695329/mazebofini.pdf
    • http://files.bensawyermusic.co.uk/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740218/kelupotamevivok.pdf
    • http://files.jonathanmladd.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437474/2f11b92dd.pdf
    • http://files.thedreamblog.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813965/3b3ce060.pdf
    • http://files.storymakerlife.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163953/6474430.pdf
    • http://files.aerialfittv.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871951/bawofovizufenuj-xanum-nodituma-luzumilatul.pdf
    • http://files.picernehomes.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969405/fanot-gafapeb-kesironejogevuf-fobajodaraxad.pdf
    • http://files.jlwarfieldministries.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858287/5173616.pdf
    • http://files.legacyhorselogging.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636990/rakofidi-tuxujojaxeki.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://jabofape.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/76106800915.pdf
    • https://gutigodawu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/17764917891.pdf
    • https://movupasu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/jopolipejowapedilegasinop.pdf
    • https://zimufijane.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/23941961672.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8012/2532/files/57989299012.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/zitadeduwifugegumav.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xixuvedivikeror.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5717/6986/files/45553090025.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b9ca.bin
5625e490f0e20244540c3396f20204efd612cfdf73131a97ad42d97b6bf89b16		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB9CA 5340 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000cc12.bin
1fbeb9e0f8f05218afb81bbfa7c8f31029b028e5f42c62c33f82dc2cc64a8aa0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCC12 10680 bytes

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