Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7bc3d0a93f08f380…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.41 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 0d30640229f49041e2fac51f6963de6f SHA-1: 4bc0004f59445593a27b08f4f7c333b8a31b43fa SHA-256: 7bc3d0a93f08f380d6e649606f5b60320bccfa118ede6f1b476342c7d8f1ab81
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199, which is used to download and execute a remote payload. The embedded URL points to a suspicious domain, likely serving the second-stage malware. An embedded PDF with a lure was also detected, suggesting a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://swisswithbestthecnologywithbetteranswerforbetterpeoplesgivenmebesttechno.Asia@st3.pro/hqIUSTh

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000d3c00.pdf
55f446ad01c0e7a4809023a8b2d11106ccfddd3b139a6e26df6e6da0f0fe4fee		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xD3C00 609792 bytes

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