Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7bb7aca06751209a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.32 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 217287b40215856d67088493bb4fa83d SHA-1: 0185a4d3f029bd831fd45453a2bf1dbfbd4ca0c2 SHA-256: 7bb7aca06751209ac152fc715d6813fbcb45c88aea0ef06b71e5dfe31133fe00
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 indicate that this RTF document exploits a known vulnerability in the Microsoft Equation Editor component. The OLE object data and embedded OLE object heuristics further support the exploitation of embedded objects. The document's purpose is to leverage this exploit for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off002433d9.bin
9f56abc5890cb8a10abc3d3fd1f5c037ea002b5b918e98eb8ff18447cb5e13d0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2433D9 3732 bytes