Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7bb0b95bca76ea6c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

341.2 KB
MD5: c5165bd2018890b3be25b7b360910dfa SHA-1: 4c9347c2085e6b7cc176b958d20a1240032e34c6 SHA-256: 7bb0b95bca76ea6c989ee21ffaebe24d04d812664418567f7f25e1b5a5c39989
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate embedded content. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or editing. This combination strongly suggests an attack pattern where embedded OLE objects are used to execute arbitrary code, bypassing security measures. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided heuristics.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
edff6f91542d309d5a0614135537634aefc212cc67b6a06e8aa23e5a0e62e98d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 75728 bytes
objdata_01_off00027154.bin
f4c761490fd63fc4aa791746a9a2b588dafd9e2c764f57f0c85377b99ef07062
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x27154 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000286f7.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x286F7 12297 bytes