Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ba95e56a06126f4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.1 KB Created: 2020-07-10 07:56:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f1d56d9b0151ecb7143d9bbd85019e86 SHA-1: 0135efa6e382505774af4b607ebdc26083f960e5 SHA-256: 7ba95e56a06126f4c77779ecc3506842519044e9120f6e8f385d65c4a0c9f844
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file is identified as malicious due to its function as a link farm, containing numerous embedded URLs pointing to other PDF documents. One URL, 'https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=arabic%20calligraphy%20thuluth%20pdf', is flagged as a malicious redirector. The extensive list of links suggests an attempt at SEO manipulation or distribution of further malicious content, potentially leading to exploitation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=arabic%20calligraphy%20thuluth%20pdf
    • http://files.stbarnabasborregosprings.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856877/8850054.pdf
    • http://files.bbawakeblogs.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437268/66807.pdf
    • http://files.exmouthcaninecentre.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874128/jenasaj.pdf
    • http://files.detonchoenvironmental.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969294/a9fe8d84b568a26.pdf
    • http://files.mc-authority.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069897/8275045.pdf
    • http://files.carburettormagazine.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814652/muwomogexabirula.pdf
    • http://files.krabidream.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681566/3285554.pdf
    • http://files.desertskydoodles.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379168/399083.pdf
    • http://files.allaboutbarackobama.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163723/togesezas-muvomon-bakevuxipavagaz-kopanapu.pdf
    • http://files.prescottrealestatereferrals.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874614/lalilibu_wesal.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://sipivasug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/futasuguragap.pdf
    • https://fevunuwunu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/72555053985.pdf
    • https://bawavokekixe.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/22958204959.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/37394074323.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/13164506765.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/tesip.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007c2a.bin
d06e6d2f694154fa1e20b2ab9e8ca00a2eae18c16103e065f02f22bb1768935e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C2A 5016 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008d48.bin
448bfb78df5a68c7622eb9f6927b667e157a2eb0f3a13538d364d23e8e23bd65		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8D48 10160 bytes

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