Qbot — Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b74090e7018b372…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

21.4 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 14.0300
MD5: fa3e589449efeb05e46f0a1e848ed00a SHA-1: d8ec90513894d030ec7073ace3fae9afce5753a5 SHA-256: 7b74090e7018b37243727957d386e69708370fd43d073a6dd00816dbb25f70ab
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Qbot · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The file contains critical heuristics indicating Excel 4.0 macros that utilize WinAPI functions like URLDownloadToFileA and ShellExecuteA. These macros are designed to download a payload from the URL http://atnoinc.com/21.psd and execute it, likely establishing a Qbot infection. The presence of these specific functions and the detected ClamAV signature strongly suggest this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 6

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
  • XLM payload reassembled from CHAR()/split formulas critical OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD
    An Excel 4.0 macro sheet builds its payload inside the formula token stream by concatenating per-character CHAR() calls and string fragments, so no WinAPI name, shell command, or URL is ever contiguous in the .bin for a literal-bytes scan to find. Reassembling the formulas recovered download/execute API names, LOLBin commands (regsvr32/rundll32/mshta/wmic/powershell), or a payload URL — the de-obfuscated download-and-run kill chain.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.QbotDocu12020-9818439-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Dropper.QbotDocu12020-9818439-0
  • XLM payload URL string (1 URL) info OOXML_XLM_PAYLOAD_URL
    An Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro-sheet workbook with download/execute evidence carries a literal http(s) URL stored as a (often UTF-16) string in the shared-string table or a cell. This is the next-stage payload host referenced by the macro download chain (URLDownloadToFile/ShellExecute); surfaced as an IOC.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://atnoinc.com/21.psd

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
xlm_sheet_00.bin
3fd5d57a928c8ba818db7c001502d9473d992f17b434009561c9d63b9b02fe10
xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 22574 bytes