Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b718abce03415c8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.1 KB Created: 2021-02-28 18:33:01 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: d0a9dd1d4b06b9c63256f3b5d05b90db SHA-1: edb46f0ed8548875724a368c938acf90386e7396 SHA-256: 7b718abce03415c8664c80fe1488209eaee90570374962a71783c9075d8c7fd3
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of external links pointing to other PDFs hosted on disposable domains, a common tactic for SEO manipulation or distributing malware. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or trojan distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the structure suggests the PDF itself is designed to lure users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://botokaw.ru/wb?keyword=privilege%20power%20and%20difference%20chapter%208%20summary PDF link annotation
    • https://zikixitifo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134897390/mizagukifuseritiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://toxoladosa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479392/3012929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4390366/normal_60014c9a8c8c9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mezulawa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134597648/vulibabeluxabefeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lafajadisevo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454770/993cd2afefe4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zomafada.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134772300/juziw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368494/normal_5fde1ef5c08e0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413370/normal_6025baf2a29c8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wunepilupizuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857535/1076923.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://doxewoga.iblogger.org/36050601438.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://lirofad.epizy.com/munifikejunorolejodilod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://petojijoxura.onlinewebshop.net/spring_framework_guru_swagger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e254.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE254 5900 bytes
SHA-256: a1536d1594c80f23ed3b3e01045e51fb0d6a48eb3c34baca9f72e418107686e7
font_01_sfnt_off0000f64d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF64D 10168 bytes
SHA-256: bcf43f43224d31dd262838c14f2bf9c59f540a0d2e9f52a0d0813e2fae9d0d01
font_02_sfnt_off00011916.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11916 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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