Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b5e90d03d8b1d0b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.0 KB Created: 2020-11-04 16:46:18 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 149b4307403fe0d39cfa6b2bf0a43f7e SHA-1: 9e5fe872ee5b26f44c23dc740d9f8dc4778879f6 SHA-256: 7b5e90d03d8b1d0b8697a188f7299d0fcaded0d4a84b45ab01cb1eaec2028367
174 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link farm and a specific malicious redirector URL, indicating an attempt to lead users to malicious content. The 'SE_CALLBACK_LURE' heuristic suggests a phishing or scam pretext, likely to trick users into clicking the embedded link. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of a malicious document designed for initial access.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=leave+form+us+army+fillable+pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425487/normal_5f9a4b3535b91.pdf
    • https://mumixopid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872042/6210515.pdf
    • https://fabodafulunulof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134372089/8391154.pdf
    • https://zexivuwesime.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134356920/8db40d3380b.pdf
    • https://vuxozajuje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379873/kinufijozulof.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4390051/normal_5fa015825e358.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dinisemowoge/how_to_in_text_cite_beowulf.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/robumuduluwise/51847013563.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fejififimaketo/wing_chun_techniques.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kulinisokakewi/code_name_verity_online.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rovotafavap/fonuzofakipij.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ladojenefe/information_security_architecture_model.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kiwopusafize/synonyms_list_for_ielts_reading.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vunizi/b._sc_agriculture_syllabus_2018.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008677.bin
c67ab2715dc1ec577a9a8fab03f1df4dc7f9f8f351ad47a1a5a5bbb16a8b374c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8677 5428 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000098e2.bin
5869808a145fa7851d514cce200f0c71f1ed1ca03fb9fca11e759e3e5a2a9ed2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x98E2 11196 bytes

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