Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b370a2c49a1dea8…

MALICIOUS

RTF

41.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-25
MD5: d700eb7c8d92973910badaf4baf3ce48 SHA-1: 3104baaac098e8cb569269640387947242f83327 SHA-256: 7b370a2c49a1dea80d74d22797c03eee3a334405635f57fda595bb9da6ca0bf1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicating an attempt to exploit this component. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000488e.bin
9038e4206fae0194b399006c92c9563c86ffa043321104ff046bac0a691b1b5e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x488E 1665 bytes